Rape – Sexual Assault Statute of Limitations California
CCP § 335.1. Assault; Battery; Personal injury; Wrongful death
CCP § 335.1. Assault; Battery; Personal injury; Wrongful death
Author: Brad Nakase, Attorney
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An action for assault or rape brought more than two and one-half years after the assault is barred by CCP § 340 (now CCP § 335.1). Robbins v. Law (Cal. App. 1920), 48 Cal. App. 555, 192 P. 118.
Where the injuries flowing from an assault and battery were immediately not substantial, but later became so, the provisions of CCP § 340(3) (now CCP § 335.1) were not tolled until the seriousness of the injuries was discovered. Sonbergh v. MacQuarrie (Cal. App. 1952), 112 Cal. App. 2d 771, 247 P.2d 133.
Claims arising from an employee’s sexual abuse of patients at a psychiatric hospital were timely brought as dependent adult abuse claims because a two-year limitation period, not the one-year period for professional negligence claims, applied as a consequence of the jury’s finding of reckless neglect. Clear and convincing evidence showed a reckless failure to protect patients because it was obvious that inadequate policies left patients vulnerable to sexual predation. Samantha B. v. Aurora Vista Del Mar, LLC (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2022), 292 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324, 77 Cal. App. 5th 85.
Pro se patient’s complaint against foreign doctor for assault and battery was dismissed pursuant to 28 USCS § 1915(e)(2), without prejudice to filing a paid complaint; the patient’s cause of action, which was predicated on a surgery that occurred in the 1980’s, was barred by California’s one year (now two year) statute of limitations, as then contained in CCP § 340 (see now CCP § 335.1). Binshyang Soong v. Shyue Yih Chang.
Complaint of petitioner, involuntarily committed pursuant to civil commitment proceedings under California’s sexually violent predator law, pursuant to 42 USCS § 1983, would be dismissed as time barred under the one year (now two year) limitations period then applicable pursuant to CCP § 340 (now CCP § 335.1); further, the petitioner, who insisted that his commitment was civil in nature, was not entitled to any tolling of the limitations period for the disability of imprisonment under CCP § 352.1. Johnson v. Mayberg.
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