Car Motorcycle Truck Motor Vehicle Owner Liability – Defense – Use Beyond Scope of Permission

[Name of defendant] claims that [he/she/nonbinary pronoun] is not responsible for [name of plaintiff]’s harm because [name of driver]’s use of the vehicle exceeded the scope of the permission given. To succeed, [name of defendant] must prove both of the following:

1. That [name of defendant], by words or conduct, gave permission to [name of driver] to use the vehicle for a limited time, place, or purpose; and
2. That [name of driver]’s use of the vehicle substantially violated the time, place, or purpose specified.
   
   Law

• Permissive Use. Vehicle Code section 17150.
  
  
• “[W]here the permission is granted for a limited time, any use after the expiration of the period is without consent, and the owner is not liable, unless the circumstances justify an inference of implied consent to further use. [U] . . . On principle, there is no fundamental ground of distinction between a limitation of time and one of purpose or place, insofar as permission is concerned; and it would seem clear that a substantial violation of either limitation terminates the original express consent and makes the subsequent use without permission [U . . . [T]he substantial violation of limitations as to locality or purpose of use operate in the same manner as violation of time limitations, absolving the owner from liability.” (Henrietta v. Evans (1938) 10 Cal.2d 526, 528-529 [75 P.2d 1051], internal citations omitted.)
  
  
• “[W]here restrictions by the owner as to time, purpose, or area are involved, the owner’s permission is considered terminated only where there has been a substantial violation of such restrictions, and it is a question of fact whether under all the circumstances presented, such restrictions as to time, purpose, or area have been substantially violated prior to the occurrence of the accident so as to vitiate the owner’s permission and thus absolve him from the vicarious liability imposed under [the predecessor to section 17150].” (Peterson v. Grieger, Inc. (1961) 57 Cal.2d 43, 52 [17 Cal.Rptr. 828, 367 P.2d 420], internal citations omitted.)
  
  
• “What is a substantial deviation from a permitted use is a question of fact under the circumstances of each case.” (Garmon v. Sebastian (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 254, 260 [5 Cal.Rptr. 101].)
  
  
• Under Cal. Veh. Code § 17150, “permissive use” means use that is expressly or impliedly within the scope of permission as to time, place and purpose, as granted by the owner. The question of permission cannot be left to speculation or assumed. A plaintiff must affirmatively show that the vehicle’s owner permitted the driver to use the vehicle.  Marquez v. Enter. Rent-A-Car, 53 Cal. App. 4th 319
• Cases in which courts found implied permission under Cal. Veh. Code § 17150, rest heavily on the circumstances surrounding the use of the vehicles. Often, the general relationship between the owner and driver is of paramount importance. Some relationships, such as spousal, parent/child, or principle/agent, create a strong inference of implied permission.  Marquez v. Enter. Rent-A-Car, 53 Cal. App. 4th 319
• Under Veh. Code, § 17150, which makes the owner of a vehicle liable for injuries resulting from negligent operation of the vehicle by any person using the vehicle with the owner’s permission, “permissive use” means use that is expressly or impliedly within the scope of permission as to time, place, and purpose, as granted by the owner. The question of permission cannot be left to speculation or assumed. The injured party who claims permissive use must affirmatively show that the vehicle’s owner permitted the driver to use the vehicle. Marquez v. Enter. Rent-A-Car, 53 Cal. App. 4th 319.
• With respect to the effect of use of the insured vehicle by a permissive user in excess of permission given, the liberal or so-called “initial permission” rule provides that, if a person has permission to use an automobile in the first instance, any subsequent use while it remains in his possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties, is a permissive use within the terms of an omnibus clause. The only limitation on the “initial permission” rule is that the subsequent use must not be equivalent to theft or the like. The rule is based on the theory that the insurance contract is as much for the benefit of the public as for the insured and that it is undesirable to permit litigation as to the details of the permission and use. Jordan v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App. 3d 26.
  
  
• The “initial permission” rule is the rule most consonant with the public policy of the State of California. Under that rule, if a person has permission to use an automobile in the first instance, any subsequent use while it remains in his possession though not within the contemplation of the parties is a permissive use within the terms of an omnibus clause.  Jordan v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App. 3d 26.