Accident Law: Negligent Entrustment of Motor Vehicle Car Truck Motorcycle to Another Driver Causing Accident

[Name of plaintiff] claims that [he/she/nonbinary pronoun] was harmed because [name of defendant] negligently permitted [name of driver] to use [name of defendant]’s vehicle. To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:

1. That [name of driver] was negligent in operating the vehicle;
2. That [name of defendant] [owned the vehicle operated by [name of driver]/had possession of the vehicle operated by [name of driver] with the owner’s permission];
3. That [name of defendant] knew, or should have known, that [name of driver] was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle;
4. That [name of defendant] permitted [name of driver] to drive the vehicle; and
5. That [name of driver]’s incompetence or unfitness to drive was a substantial factor in causing harm to [name of plaintiff].
   
   

Laws

• Permissive Use by Unlicensed Driver. Vehicle Code section 14606(a).
  
  
• Permissive Use by Unlicensed Minor. Vehicle Code section 14607.
  
  
• Rental to Unlicensed Driver. Vehicle Code section 14608(a).
  
  
• Cal. Veh. Code §14606(a) in relevant part provides that no person may knowingly permit or authorize the driving of a motor vehicle, owned by him or under his control, upon the highways by any person unless the person is then licensed for the appropriate class of vehicle to be driven. This statute (and its predecessors) make a motor vehicle owner who knowingly entrusts his vehicle to an unlicensed driver liable for a third party’s injuries caused by the driver’s negligence. The cause of action parallels that at common law for negligent entrustment, resting on a demonstration of knowing entrustment to an incompetent or dangerous driver with actual or constructive knowledge of his incompetence.  Dodge Ctr. v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. App. 3d 332.
  
  
• “ ‘ “[I]t is generally recognized that one who places or entrusts his [or her] motor vehicle in the hands of one whom he [or she] knows, or from the circumstances is charged with knowing, is incompetent or unfit to drive, may be held liable for an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by that driver, provided the plaintiff can establish that the injury complained of was proximately caused by the driver’s disqualification, incompetency, inexperience or recklessness ………. ” ’ ” (Flores v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1063 [116 Cal.Rptr.3d 71].)
  
  

• “A rental car company may be held liable for negligently entrusting one of its cars to a customer In determining whether defendant was negligent in entrusting its car to [the driver], defendant’s conduct is to be measured by what an ordinarily prudent person would do in similar circumstances.” (Osborn v. Hertz Corp. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 703, 709 [252 Cal.Rptr. 613], internal citations omitted.)

• “Liability for negligent entrustment is determined by applying general principles of negligence, and ordinarily it is for the jury to determine whether the owner has exercised the required degree of care.” (Allen v. Toledo (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 415, 421 [167 Cal.Rptr. 270], internal citations omitted.)
  
  
• “A claim that an employer was negligent in hiring or retaining an employee­driver rarely differs in substance from a claim that an employer was negligent in entrusting a vehicle to the employee. Awareness, constructive or actual, that a person is unfit or incompetent to drive underlies a claim that an employer was negligent in hiring or retaining that person as a driver. (See Judicial Council of Cal. Civ. Jury Instns. (2011) CACI No. 426.) That same awareness underlies a claim for negligent entrustment. (See CACI No. 724.) In a typical case, like this, the two claims are functionally identical.” (Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, 1157 [126 Cal.Rptr.3d 443, 253 P.3d 535].)
  
  
• “[I]f an employer admits vicarious liability for its employee’s negligent driving in the scope of employment, ‘the damages attributable to both employer and employee will be coextensive.’ Thus, when a plaintiff alleges a negligent entrustment or hiring cause of action against the employer and the employer admits vicarious liability for its employee’s negligent driving, the universe of defendants who can be held responsible for plaintiff’s damages is reduced by one—the employer—for purposes of apportioning fault under Proposition 51. Consequently, the employer would not be mentioned on the special verdict form. The jury must divide fault for the accident among the listed tortfeasors, and the employer is liable only for whatever share of fault the jury assigns to the employee.” (Diaz, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1159, internal citation omitted.)
  
  
• “[O]rdinarily, in the absence of a special relationship between the parties, there is no duty to control the conduct of a third person so as to prevent him from causing harm to another and . . . this rule applies even where the third person’s conduct is made possible only because the defendant has relinquished control of his property to the third person, unless the defendant has reason to believe that the third person is incompetent to manage it.” (Grafton v. Mollica (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 860, 863 [42 Cal.Rptr. 306].)
  
  
• “[T]he tort requires demonstration of actual knowledge of facts showing or suggesting the driver’s incompetence—not merely his lack of a license……………………………………. For liability to exist, knowledge must be shown of the user’s incompetence or inability safely to use the [vehicle].” (Dodge Center v. Superior Court (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 332, 341 [244 Cal.Rptr. 789], internal citations omitted.)
  
  
• “Knowledge of possession of a temporary permit allowing a person to drive only if accompanied by a licensed driver is sufficient to put the entrustor ‘upon inquiry as to the competency of ’ the unlicensed driver It is then for the jury to determine under the circumstances whether the entrustor is negligent in permitting the unlicensed driver to operate the vehicle.” (Nault v. Smith (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 257, 267-268 [14 Cal.Rptr. 889], internal citations omitted.)
  
  
• “In cases involving negligent entrustment of a vehicle, liability ‘ “is imposed on [a] vehicle owner or permitter because of his own independent negligence and not the negligence of the driver.” ’ ” (Ghezavat v. Harris (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 555, 559 [252 Cal.Rptr.3d 887].)
  
  

• “[E]ntrustment of a vehicle to an intoxicated person is not negligence per se. A plaintiff must prove defendant had knowledge of plaintiff’s incompetence when entrusting the vehicle.” (Blake v. Moore (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 700, 706 [208 Cal.Rptr. 703].)
  
  
• “[T]he mere sale of an automobile to an unlicensed and inexperienced person does not constitute negligence per se.” (Perez v. G & W Chevrolet, Inc. (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 766, 768 [79 Cal.Rptr. 287].)
  
  
• “It is well-settled that where a company knows that an employee has no operator’s license that such knowledge is sufficient to put the employer on inquiry as to his competency; it is for the jury to determine under such circumstances whether the employer was negligent in permitting the employee to drive a vehicle.” (Syah v. Johnson (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 534, 545 [55 Cal.Rptr. 741].)
  
  
• “[I]t has generally been held that the owner of an automobile is under no duty to persons who may be injured by its use to keep it out of the hands of a third person in the absence of facts putting the owner on notice that the third person is incompetent to handle it.” (Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 63 [271 P.2d 23], internal citations omitted.)
  
  
• “[T]he mere fact of co-ownership does not prevent one co-owner from controlling use of the vehicle by the other co-owner. Thus, where . . . plaintiff alleges that one co-owner had power over the use of the vehicle by the other and that the negligent co-owner drove with the express or implied consent of such controlling co-owner, who knew of the driver’s incompetence, the basis for a cause of action for negligent entrustment has been stated.” (Mettelka v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1245, 1250 [219 Cal.Rptr. 697].)
• No statute makes it unlawful for a motor vehicle retailer to sell to an unlicensed driver. Similarly no statute imposes on such a retailer a duty to inquire as to the purchaser’s license status. Dodge Ctr. v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. App. 3d 332.
  
  
• Pursuant to Veh. Code, § 14606, subd. (a), a motor vehicle owner who knowingly entrusts his vehicle to an unlicensed driver is liable for a third party’s injuries caused by the driver’s negligence. The cause of action parallels that at common law for negligent entrustment, resting on a demonstration of knowing entrustment to an incompetent or dangerous driver with actual or constructive knowledge of his incompetence. However, like the common law cause of action, § 14606 requires a showing of knowledge of the lack of a license; in the absence of such knowledge there is no duty to inquire. Dodge Ctr. v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. App. 3d 332